MISSED AGAIN: making space for partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan response
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The report was designed by Anthony Neal of CAFOD.

A note on the title: This report, Missed again: Making space for humanitarian partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan response highlights some of the challenges identified in the research related to partnership working in the Philippines during the humanitarian response to the destruction caused by Typhoon Haiyan. It is a companion research to the Missed opportunities report which was published in October 2013 by the same five international NGOs. The title is not a comment on the humanitarian response effort as a whole.

Section Headers:
A cash-for-work project, implemented by CAFOD partner Catholic Relief Services (CRS), clearing rubble following Typhoon Haiyan in Palo, Leyte Island (CAFOD/Ben White)
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### Acronyms

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<td>AAP</td>
<td>accountability to affected populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDSW</td>
<td>A Single Drop for Safe Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Alyansa Tigil Mina (Alliance Against Mining)</td>
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<td>CARRAT</td>
<td>Christian Aid Rapid Response Assessment Team</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>climate change adaptation</td>
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<td>CCI</td>
<td>Coastal Core International</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>Centre for Empowerment and Resource Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CwC</td>
<td>Communications with Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>disaster risk reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERF</td>
<td>Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>humanitarian coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Consortium</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>International Care Ministries</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNGO</td>
<td>national non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDRRMO</td>
<td>Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGU</td>
<td>local government unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMWD</td>
<td>Leyte Municipal Water District</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASSA</td>
<td>National Secretariat for Social Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDRRMC</td>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>Office of Civil Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPARR</td>
<td>Office of the Presidential Assistant on Rehabilitation and Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEA</td>
<td>Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAY</td>
<td>Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC/HC</td>
<td>resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>Strategic Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCSAC</td>
<td>United Nations Civil Society Advisory Committee</td>
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Glossary of terms

A glossary of terms used in this report is provided below. Meanings and explanations of the terms are given on the right.

<table>
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<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Fund (ERF)</td>
<td>ERFs have been established in 20 countries since 1997 to provide NGOs and UN agencies with rapid and flexible funding to address critical gaps in humanitarian emergencies. ERFs, also known as Humanitarian Response Funds in some countries, are usually established to meet unforeseen needs. ERFs predominantly fund NGOs and support local NGO capacity building. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (see below) and have clear responsibilities for coordination. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Framework for Preparedness</td>
<td>The Common Framework for Preparedness (the Common Framework), called for by the IASC Principles as part of the Transformative Agenda, supports the coherent development of preparedness capacity, using a systematic country-level approach that collectively assesses capacity and need, uses this assessment to jointly develop programmes and plans, and coherently implements these programmes and plans to strengthen preparedness. Preparedness is situated within an overall, nationally led, disaster risk management (DRM) context, which includes prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery measures. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)</td>
<td>The HCT is a strategic and operational decision-making and oversight forum established and led by the Humanitarian Coordinator (see below). Composition includes representatives from the United Nations, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The HCT is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues related to humanitarian action. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian coordinator (HC)</td>
<td>The HC is responsible for assessing whether or not an international response to a crisis is warranted and for ensuring the humanitarian response efforts, if needed, are well organised. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)</td>
<td>The IASC is an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. Under the leadership of the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, the IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 (L3) activation</td>
<td>An L3 response is a mutually agreed process to define a humanitarian system-wide emergency activation, which is determined based on five criteria: scale, complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk. If the IASC declares an ‘L3’ crisis, a system-wide response is automatically activated, for an initial duration of up to three months, and a series of mechanisms and tools is triggered. The ‘L3’ activation commits IASC organisations to ensure that they put in place the necessary systems and mobilise adequate resources to contribute to the response with regard to inter-agency coordination mechanisms as a complement to agency-specific operational and response capacity. 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC)</td>
<td>The OECD/DAC is a forum to discuss issues surrounding aid, development and poverty reduction in developing countries. 8 The OECD/DAC criteria for evaluating complex emergencies were developed in 1999 and include relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage and connectedness. 9</td>
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Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.\(^\text{10}\)

Operational peer review

The **operational peer review** is one of five elements of the revitalised humanitarian programme cycle, introduced as part of the Transformative Agenda. It is a light touch **internal, inter-agency management tool** which identifies areas for immediate corrective action, early in a response.\(^\text{11}\)

Principles of Partnership (PoP)

In recognition of the need for partnership to become a more integral aspect of humanitarian response, the Global Humanitarian Platform adopted PoP in 2007 to support national and international NGOs to strengthen their relationships, underscoring the value of each actor’s contribution, and emphasising the importance of building relationships on the basis of transparency and trust.\(^\text{12}\)

Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY)

Developed in December 2013 by the National Economic and Development Authority of the Government of the Philippines, RAY provides comprehensive damage and loss assessments to determine the overall recovery and reconstruction needs in the areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan.\(^\text{13}\)

Strategic Response Plan (SRP)

The Strategic Response Plan was prepared by the Humanitarian Country Team and is designed to support the Government of the Philippines’ response to the immediate humanitarian needs of the people affected by Typhoon Haiyan, and complements the government’s recovery efforts\(^\text{14}\).

Transformative Agenda (TA)

Introduced in December 2011, the Transformative Agenda focuses on three key areas: empowered leadership, improved accountability to disaster-affected people and improved coordination.\(^\text{15}\)

World Humanitarian Summit

The first World Humanitarian Summit will take place in 2016. A three-year process of consultation aims to find new ways to tackle humanitarian needs and set a new agenda for global humanitarian action. It focuses on four main themes of humanitarian effectiveness: reducing vulnerability and managing risk, transformation through innovation and serving the needs of people in conflict.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^{5}\) Ibid.

\(^{6}\) Ibid.


\(^{10}\) www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are (accessed 20 June 2014).


\(^{16}\) www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/ (accessed 7 July 2014).
Executive Summary

Introduction

Humanitarian partnerships between national and international organisations are a long-established means of responding to humanitarian need. As long ago as 1994 the NGO/Red Cross Code of Conduct emphasised the importance of working collaboratively with national organisations, and in 2007 the Principles of Partnership outlined best practice in humanitarian partnership working. Given the considerable support that exists for humanitarian partnership it is disappointing that as recently as 2012, in her preface to ALNAP’s State of the Humanitarian System report, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs lamented the ‘lack of inclusion of non-traditional actors such as National Disaster Management Authorities and southern NGOs... which undermined the effectiveness of many operations’.

With its focus on national actors, this study focuses on the vexed question of humanitarian partnership and seeks to provide evidence, in real time, of how far partnership working happened in the response to Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) in the Philippines, and its effectiveness.

Methods and approach

The study was undertaken by one national and one international researcher, and used the following methods:

- A literature review to examine previous lessons from humanitarian action in the Philippines and emerging findings from the Haiyan response (88 documents)
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions with UN agencies (9 interviews), international NGOs (INGOs) (19 interviews), national NGOs (NNGOs) (23 interviews), government representatives (5 interviews), donor agencies (6 interviews) and community members (5 focus group discussions)
- Three weeks’ in-country research, including in Manila, Leyte, Cebu and Samar

The research follows on from, and builds on, the findings of the 2013 report Missed opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses. It makes recommendations for action to strengthen partnership between the national and international humanitarian systems in the Philippines and more broadly in humanitarian responses in the future.

The effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in the Typhoon Haiyan Response

- The proximity to and knowledge of communities brought by NNGOs to partnerships strengthened the relevance of humanitarian assistance.
- Where INGOs had invested in NNGO humanitarian consortia, partnerships contributed to a timely response although in direct delivery, INGOs were among the swiftest to respond.
- The greater technical knowledge that INGOs had of accountability mechanisms was complemented by NNGOs’ greater engagement with communities, which strengthened the effectiveness of the response.
- Lower overhead costs and salaries meant that NNGOs offered efficiencies over INGOs but these were offset by the additional costs borne by INGOs for operational and technical support for partners.
- While INGOs working in partnership with faith-based NNGOs benefited from their extensive networks, direct delivery by INGOs accounted for much of the coverage and in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon this was often prioritised over partnership. While NNGOs with significant experience in a disaster-affected area can strengthen the connectedness of humanitarian response, the limited prior presence of NNGOs in the Visayas weakened this.

This study underscores many of the findings of the Missed opportunities research that preceded it; that humanitarian partnership can strengthen the appropriateness of assistance, offer efficiencies, and contribute to a more connected response affording greater sustainability. However, while the study has shown the potential for humanitarian partnerships to deliver effective assistance, it has also revealed weaknesses in NNGO partners’ capacity that challenged the ability of partnerships to respond at
scale. While NNGOs were among the earliest responders to the typhoon, they played a relatively minor role in comparison with INGOs which tended to have greater access to funding, and superior logistics capacity that allowed them to work at significant scale. It is the combination of the comparative advantages possessed by INGOs and NNGOs that offers the most effective humanitarian partnership and while there were some examples of these, there were also many instances where partnership was de-prioritised, overlooked or ignored.

The role of national actors in leadership, coordination and financing in the Haiyan response

- The response demanded by Typhoon Haiyan was of a magnitude that overwhelmed existing disaster management systems and with the Level 3 activation, humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms had an international look and feel.
- NNGOs largely felt out of place in the Clusters and absented themselves, although INGO partners did play a role in facilitating attendance or representing their partners.
- There was very little direct funding of NNGOs through traditional humanitarian donors. INGO partners played a key role in providing funds to support national scale-up and response.

Despite efforts made to include local and national actors in the Haiyan response it remained largely internationally led, coordinated and implemented. While the scale of the disaster outstripped the capacity of government and NNGOs to adequately respond, more could have been done to build capacity in advance of the Typhoon to prepare for and strengthen partnership for response. Six months after Haiyan struck, the international humanitarian system was still struggling with the task of responsibly handing over the leadership and coordination of the recovery response to the government. At the same time, INGOs were starting the process of handing over large operational programmes to NNGOs. The lack of adequate support to assist the Philippines to prepare for large-scale disasters and the lack of willingness to entrust a greater share of the response to national organisations has played an important role in the perceived need to ‘scale-up to scale-down’ – shorthand for a further influx of international capacity to build national capacity in key institutions in order to permit these handovers. The findings of the study suggest that this is true across all aspects of the response – leadership, coordination and implementation. There are widespread fears within civil society that one of the implications of such an internationalised response is that it is highly vulnerable as capacity is withdrawn.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Many of the findings of the study about the shortcomings of how international and national organisations work together in disasters in the Philippines echo similar findings documented after previous humanitarian responses in the country. However, one issue that stands out in the Haiyan response more than others (and was also a finding of the Missed opportunities study) is the challenge of taking partnership to scale, and it is this that sets an important and urgent agenda for the humanitarian community. Despite considerable experience of national-led humanitarian response in the Philippines and the significant capacity of civil society, the limited scale of humanitarian partnerships in the Haiyan response and the tendency of agencies that seek to balance direct delivery and partnership to prioritise the former over the latter suggest it may be necessary to moderate expectations of what scale of response can be achieved through humanitarian partnerships. Translated to the global context where human vulnerability is growing as the potential for larger and more frequent disasters increases, it is this aspect of humanitarian partnerships more than others that requires greater investigation and investment.

The international humanitarian community should prioritise investment in humanitarian partnerships to enable rapid and quality scale ups:

Action must be taken both in the Philippines and in other countries vulnerable to disaster risk to engage government, national and international humanitarian stakeholders and donor agencies in strengthening national disaster response. Such a strategy should outline how a government-led and civil society-supported humanitarian system can provide effective assistance to disaster-affected people in the future.

- INGOs should support capacity development as an essential ingredient of successful partnership and publish the percentage of funds they allocate to humanitarian preparedness and capacity building.
- INGOs must improve their partner assessment tools, which were found too cumbersome and needed modifying in order to balance the demands of due diligence with sufficient agility to enable decision-making within the compressed timeframes required for an emergency response.
- INGOs should work with NNGO partners to explore practical ways of scaling up partnerships.
NGOs have the potential to provide significant national humanitarian response capacity but the Haiyan response revealed the challenges in achieving successful partnership at scale.

- In order to strengthen scale-up all international humanitarian actors, donors, UN agencies and INGOs should provide a minimum percentage of their humanitarian funding directly to NGOs, publish what this percentage is, and set themselves targets to increase it.
- INGOs must support NGOs and national humanitarian networks in the Philippines to identify key blockages to NGO participation in disaster responses, and systematically address these. This should be accompanied by an adequate level of dedicated funding. Despite the significant experience of NGOs in humanitarian response they played a relatively modest role in the Haiyan response.
- The Humanitarian Country Team should urgently review recent evaluations and act on the lessons learned. The Missed again research found evidence that humanitarian partners are repeating the same mistakes in successive humanitarian responses in the Philippines.

‘Localise’ surge responses

The Haiyan response provides an important vantage point from which the IASC can reflect on recent experience of large-scale international humanitarian responses with a view to complementing the international L3 surge mechanism with national surge capacity.

- The Inter-Agency Standing Committee should identify those countries most vulnerable to disaster or at risk of large-scale conflict and adapt the Common Framework for Preparedness to include a set of actions to ensure that an international surge can be complemented by a national one. This should include a package of training, communication and support delivered by OCHA and targeted at government representatives and NGOs.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by OCHA should strongly advocate for the establishment of an ERF in the Philippines.

International donors should contribute generously to it.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA should work with the Government of the Philippines to ensure greater coherence in the future activation and use of the Cluster system in the Philippines.
- NGOs should be immediately included in the Humanitarian Country Team. OCHA and members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee should ensure that this becomes routine in all disaster-affected countries.

Prioritise preparedness

In looking to the future of humanitarian response in the Philippines, much more needs to be done to prepare for disaster events, the most significant being to consider Typhoon Haiyan as the new ‘normal’ rather than an exception, and to systematically invest in partnerships that can meet the challenges associated with responding at scale. This can only be achieved through a transformative change in investment in preparedness and national capacity development. Alongside this, there is clearly scope for INGOs to strengthen standby partnership arrangements and to ensure partnership assessment tools are effective for rapid scale-up in the future.

- The Government of the Philippines should review and strengthen its capacity to respond at all levels in order to play its leadership role in response to large-scale crises. International donors should provide adequate funding and OCHA and NGOs should support this process providing training and technical assistance to enhance national-level preparedness.
- Given the key role that Local Government Units (LGUs) play in early response, the Government of the Philippines should fast-track the establishment of LGU Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) offices and prioritise capacity building of LGU’s.
- The Inter-Agency Standing Committee must urgently re-balance the response aspirations of the Transformative Agenda with preparedness in order for disaster-affected countries to be better placed to lead, coordinate and implement disaster response themselves.

18 The questions used in the research can be found in Annex 2. A glossary of terms can be found at the beginning of this report.
19 Five UK development and humanitarian agencies: Christian Aid, CAFOD, Oxfam GB, Tearfund and ActionAid have been collaborating since early 2012 to research experiences of partnership working in humanitarian response, and develop policy and advocacy positions to promote partnership approaches throughout the international humanitarian system. The Missed opportunities report was published in September 2013 and examined the current and future potential of partnerships with local and national NGOs in humanitarian response, based on lessons from across the commissioning agencies in four major emergency settings.
Humanitarian partnerships between national and international organisations are a long-established means of responding to humanitarian need. Over the years, humanitarian codes and standards have emphasised the importance of humanitarian actors working together. However, progress in putting principles into practice has been slow. In 1994, the Code of Conduct for the Red Cross and NGOs in Disaster Relief articulated a determination to ‘work through local non-governmental humanitarian agencies as partners in planning and implementation’, and the 2007 Principles of Partnership (PoP) endorsed by the Global Humanitarian Platform offered a collective blueprint for humanitarian partnership. So it is disappointing that as recently as 2012, in her preface to ALNAP’s State of the Humanitarian System, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs had no choice but to lament the ‘lack of inclusion of non-traditional actors such as National Disaster Management Authorities and Southern NGOs… which undermined the effectiveness of many operations’.

With its focus on national actors, this study returns to the vexed question of humanitarian partnership and seeks to provide evidence, in real time, of the extent of partnership working in the response to Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) in the Philippines.

1.2 Purpose of the study and methods

The study analysed the typhoon response to identify examples of where international NGOs (INGOs) working with local and national NGOs (collectively termed NNGOs) have improved the effectiveness of the humanitarian response, and where challenges arose, and looks more broadly at partnership between local and national actors and members of the international humanitarian system. The study was undertaken by one national and one international researcher, and used the following methods:

- A literature review to examine the lessons learned from previous humanitarian action in the Philippines, and emerging findings from the Haiyan response (88 documents)
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions with UN agencies (9 interviews), INGOs (19 interviews), NNGOs (23 interviews), government representatives (5 interviews), donor agencies (6 interviews) and community members (5 focus group discussions)
- A three-week field trip to Manila, Leyte, Cebu and Samar

The research builds on the findings of the report Missed opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses (see Box 1 for background to the Missed opportunities research) and makes recommendations for action to strengthen partnership between the national and international humanitarian system in the Philippines, and more broadly in humanitarian responses in the future.

Box 1:

Missed opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses

Five UK development and humanitarian agencies – Christian Aid, CAFOD, Oxfam GB, ActionAid and Tearfund – have been collaborating since early 2012 to research their experiences of partnership working in humanitarian response, and to develop policy and advocacy positions to promote partnership approaches throughout the international humanitarian system in advance of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.

To date, the five agencies have worked on two documents. The first, Missed opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses, was published in October 2013 and examined the current and future potential of partnerships with local and national non-governmental organisations in humanitarian response. This was based on lessons learned across the commissioning agencies in four major emergency settings: Democratic Republic of Congo’s ongoing chronic conflict; Horn and East Africa drought response (2010-2011); Haiti after the 2010 earthquake; and the Pakistan floods (2010).
In the *Missed opportunities* research, findings were grouped and analysed according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Disasters Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluating humanitarian assistance. The research found that partnership working in humanitarian action enhances the relevance and appropriateness of humanitarian responses, particularly because the understanding of context enables national and local actors to shape programmes accordingly. Effectiveness of assistance was also found to be enhanced by partnership approaches, as it ensures accountability to disaster-affected populations. Working through local partners was also found to enhance connectedness and ensure that responses take place in ways that respect longer-term perspectives. In other aspects, partnership approaches did not score so highly, for example setting up partnerships often takes considerable time and human resources which means they are not always judged to have high efficiency or be good value for money. Finally, many national partners, with a few notable exceptions, have relatively small-scale operations so coverage is not high.

As a follow-up to the research, a second ‘living’ document identifies a set of the most important practical lessons for NGOs which came out of the research (March 2014).  

### 1.3 Structure of the report

Section 1 provides an introduction to the study, outlines its purpose and the approach used. Section 2 outlines the context of vulnerability and humanitarian response in the Philippines. Section 3 draws on the experience of the commissioning agencies and other INGOs to review the effectiveness of partnerships. Section 4 examines issues of partnership between the national and international humanitarian response systems, with a focus on humanitarian leadership, coordination and financing. Based on the study’s findings, Section 5 presents a conclusion and a set of recommendations for how the international humanitarian community can strengthen the effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships, both in the Philippines and at a global level, in the future.

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20 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1994) *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*, (p.4) IFRC, Geneva.

21 The PoP support national and international NGOs to improve relationships, underscoring the value of each actor’s contribution and emphasising the importance of building relationships on the basis of transparency and trust. See [www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/pop.html](http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/pop.html).


23 The research questions are reproduced in Annex 2.

24 A list of research participants is provided in Annex 1.


The Philippines is no stranger to disaster and has a long history of disaster response. This section describes the context of vulnerability in the Philippines and outlines the role and organisation of domestic humanitarian response, and its links with the international humanitarian system.

2.1 The vulnerability of the Philippines to disasters

Situated in the Pacific ‘ring of fire’ and within the typhoon belt, the Philippines is highly vulnerable to natural hazards including volcanoes, earthquakes, tropical storms, typhoons, floods and landslides. Even in the absence of social and environmental change, these vulnerabilities would constitute significant threats to the life and livelihoods of those living in the Philippines, but coupled with a rapid growth in urbanisation and the effects of changing weather patterns, the disaster risk that these natural hazards constitute is extreme. The country can experience up to 900 earthquakes and between 15–25 Typhoons annually, making it one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world with an estimated 74 percent of the population vulnerable to natural hazards.

In addition to the threat of natural hazards, the Philippines has suffered decades of violent conflict, causing significant displacement in the south of the country—a region that has also borne the brunt of some of the most severe natural hazards.

2.2 The role of the Philippines Government in disaster response

In an effort to address the threat of disaster, the Philippines Government has developed a comprehensive set of policies to support disaster risk reduction and to promote climate change adaptation. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) placed under the Department of National Defence and implemented by the Office of Civil Defence (OCD) is responsible for preparedness and response to natural hazards. Created through the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act in 2010, the NDRRMC created a Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan in June 2011 which covers all aspects of prevention and mitigation, preparedness and response, and rehabilitation and recovery. It also provided an organisational model for each level of government including regional, provincial, municipal (and city) and barangay (village). While the OCD is tasked to coordinate preparedness and response at the regional level, a series of Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils are mandated at the other levels, each with its own Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (LDRRMO) charged with administration, training, research, planning, operations and warning. In an emergency these offices, known as Local Government Units (LGUs), are tasked with first response.

Coordination of disaster management is dependent on the scale of its impact; coordination is led by the NDRRMC if two or more regions are affected, the Regional DRRMC coordinates if two or more provinces are affected, the Provincial DRRMC coordinates if two or more cities or municipalities are affected, and the city or municipality DRRMC is tasked with coordination if two or more barangays are affected. Although the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan lists the Department of Social Welfare and Development as the lead agency for disaster response operations, the structure of the NDRRMC is oriented to a committee approach. This means that there are multiple focal agencies for international actors at the national level.

Financing for preparedness and government-led disaster response is available through the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund, for which LGUs are instructed to set aside a minimum of 5 percent of their estimated revenue which must be spent or can be accrued for up to five years; 30 percent of the LDRRMF is allocated as a Quick Response Fund for relief and recovery programmes.
2.3 Civil society, INGOs and the growth of humanitarian networks

A strong civil society, defined as ‘the section of the society that is non-state and non-corporate’ has emerged in the Philippines from the struggle to secure democratic governance post-independence and is both large in scale and diverse, including self-help groups and cooperatives; neighborhood associations and community organisations; religious and spiritual societies; professional associations including trade unions; business foundations; local charities; private voluntary organisations and NGOs.

As a result of their development experience, the engagement they have with communities and the skills that exist within their staff, NNGO’s have historically played an important role in meeting humanitarian needs in the Philippines, and depending on their size and capacity have supported international response and delivered assistance in their own right. Their greater knowledge of custom and culture, and their good standing with communities mean they are well placed to serve as a bridge between communities in need of assistance and international response agencies.

While the nature of many humanitarian partnerships in the Philippines in the past may have been best described as sub-contracting, this has begun to change in recent years with NNGOs being more involved in the design and management of humanitarian response. This has been prompted in part by the growth of national humanitarian networks where NNGOs have sought to work together in humanitarian response, often with the support of an INGO (see Box 2).

Box 2:

Humanitarian networks in the Philippines

The Christian Aid Rapid Response Assessment Team (CARRAT) was formed with the support of Christian Aid to build disaster preparedness and response capacity across development and emergency partners. It has a country-wide mandate and its members’ support capacity building and response of local partners based in areas affected by disaster.

Developed with support from Oxfam, the Humanitarian Response Consortium (HRC) was initially formed of five organisations with a mission to provide high-quality humanitarian services to humanitarian partners. Each of the local organisations has complementary specialisations and strategic operations across all three major island groups in the Philippines. In the event of a natural hazard or conflict, these organisations can come together and launch an emergency response as one consortium. In December 2012, HRC had the capacity to provide response services for up to 25,000 people, anywhere in the Philippines.

While for both CARRAT and the HRC, the resources available from INGOs have been crucial to the functioning of the network and more generally for the members’ activities, both initiatives seek to go beyond a sub-contracting relationship and to use the capacities of partners to provide timely, contextually relevant and effective humanitarian assistance throughout the Philippines.
2.4 Lessons on humanitarian partnerships prior to the Haiyan emergency response

During interviews with members of the humanitarian community, reference was frequently made to the number of lesson-learning exercises that had taken place, and the limited extent to which these have been examined in preparing for the next disaster. As a contribution to building the evidence base on humanitarian partnership and in recognition of the regularity with which mistakes have been repeated, a summary of those most pertinent to the research are outlined below. Where similar issues arise in this study, the relevant lesson is referred to in the text.34

Lesson learned 1: The importance of NNGOs and INGOs working in a complementary manner

An advocacy paper prepared by a coalition of NNGOs in 2012 during the response to Typhoon Sendong in Mindanao raised concern about the wide gap between national and international organisations in capacity and experience. They considered that this was compounded by the lack of understanding of each other’s mandate, organisation and programmes. The NNGOs are for the most part small development and advocacy organisations with little experience in engaging with large humanitarian projects, and considered that the entry of the UN and other international agencies ‘may threaten and weaken the local NNGOs rather than strengthen them.’35 This was based on the observation that a growing number of international organisations operating in Mindanao were directly implementing projects at community level without coordinating with smaller, local NNGOs, which risked compromising the coherence and sustainability of the response.36

Lesson learned 2: The need to build the capacity of NNGOs to scale-up humanitarian response

A review of the Typhoon Bopha response on behalf of a NNGO/INGO consortium raised concern about NNGO capacity limitations in large-scale humanitarian responses, in part due to high turnover of staff. It also offered reflections about the challenges of delivering at scale in partnerships, and the implications of this on relationships between INGO and NNGO partners. It was recommended that partners should reflect on how they can retain, improve and scale up human resource capacity in the face of more frequent disasters in the Philippines.37

Lesson learned 3: The importance of equality in partnerships

Humanitarian networks between INGOs and NNGOs have added significant value in the Philippines, and have had some successes in addressing issues of power and equality. However, there have also been challenges; while the aspiration has been for NNGO consortia to lead humanitarian response as an alternative model to INGOs taking the lead, a recent evaluation suggests that practice does not always follow this principle and in reality there is a confusion as to how the partnership should work, and who should lead the response when the model of partnership used often places the INGO in the driving seat.38

Lesson learned 4: The existence of parallel coordination mechanisms for national and international response

A paper documenting lessons learned from the humanitarian response to Typhoons Ketsana and Sendong observed that local networks of NNGOs rarely participate in international coordination mechanisms due to a lack of trust.39 The same study also highlighted the parallel coordination systems that co-exist in disasters in the Philippines and considered that some members of the international humanitarian community may be unaware of the Cluster system that the government has adopted for its humanitarian response.40 The Typhoon Bopha After Action Review highlighted the existence of parallel coordination structures and a lack of awareness of the international Cluster system which resulted in low participation of NNGOs in the Clusters.41

Lesson learned 5: The importance of bridging the gap between legislation and implementation of the NDRRM plan at local level and the role that partnership can play in this

Several studies have highlighted the lack of uniformity in the application of government legislation on humanitarian response at the sub-national level, suggesting that the rate and quality of the policy response is dependent on the experience of LGUs in disasters, as well as the quality of local political leadership. The studies considered that local officers were not always knowledgeable enough of legislation on disaster risk management, and stressed that while attempts have been made to create local capacity to respond better to disasters, many LGUs are not yet fully equipped with the technical skills required to fully implement legislation. The studies also considered the main problem to be limited expertise and lack of robust local data, management capacity and the funds to plan and implement well-targeted risk-reduction measures.42 The After Action Reviews from both Washi43 and Bopha44 called for greater capacity building for local governments on humanitarian coordination, and stressed the importance of institutionalising the Cluster approach in LGUs.
Lesson learned 6: The benefits of establishing a pooled fund to strengthen humanitarian financing

The After Action Review from the response to Typhoon Washi highlighted the difficult funding environment that existed in view of the fact that the Central Emergency Response Fund was exclusively for the use of UN agencies. It recommended that a pooled fund should be established to improve humanitarian financing during the early phases of a crisis.45

27 A comprehensive analysis of natural disaster risk in locations around the world undertaken by the Reinsurance Company, Swiss Re, placed Manila as the second most vulnerable city to disasters by potential numbers of people affected. Sundermann L, Schelske O and Hausmann P (2013) Mind the risk – A global ranking of cities under threat from natural disasters, Swiss Re.
30 In the 9th Edition of its Global Climate Risk Index, the think tank and research organisation Germanwatch placed the Philippines as the second most affected country by weather-related losses and the seventh most affected between 1993 and 2012. Kreft S, Eckstein D (2014) Global climate risk index 2014: Who suffers the most from extreme weather events? Briefing Paper, Germanwatch.
34 The research questions are reproduced in Annex 2.
36 Anon (2012) AGENDA/ADVOCACY PAPER: Strengthening Humanitarian and Development Interventions, through an Empowering Engagement between Local NNGOs and the UN and other International Agencies, Draft paper (p.1).
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid. (p.23).
41 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2013) Report: The After Action Review/Lessons Learned Workshops. Typhoon Bopha Response (pp.4, 8, 11)
44 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2013) Report: The After Action Review/Lessons Learned Workshops. Typhoon Bopha Response (pp.4, 7, 8)
Using the OECD/DAC criteria for humanitarian evaluation, this section builds on the Missed opportunities research by assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in the context of the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan. The section provides a brief overview of the humanitarian consequences of the typhoon and examines the contribution made by partnerships to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage and connectedness of the response.

3.1 A deadly storm: Typhoon Haiyan and its humanitarian consequences

Typhoon Haiyan made its first of six landfalls in Eastern Samar on 8 November 2013. With wind speeds of more than 300 km/h and storm surges of over four metres, it affected nine of the country’s 17 administrative regions. The damage it caused was catastrophic, with 6,201 deaths and a further 14 million people affected. The disaster damaged or destroyed 1.1 million houses, displaced 4 million people and wrought havoc on fragile livelihood systems. In some of the hardest hit areas, particularly in coastal communities which had suffered both the high winds and storm surge (such as Leyte province and the southern tip of Eastern Samar), the storm disrupted power, telecommunications and water supplies.

3.2 Have partnerships enhanced the relevance and appropriateness of assistance?

Relevance and appropriateness are central to the effectiveness of aid. But research findings and beneficiary surveys frequently find that humanitarian aid is not always relevant to the needs and aspirations of affected populations. The reasons given include a weak understanding of local contexts, an inability to engage with the changing nature of need, poor information-gathering techniques and inflexibility of response.

The Philippines is a middle-income country with significant capacity both in government and within civil society, and many INGOs had either exited the country or scaled-back their programmes. This meant that many agencies had a fairly small presence and although most had humanitarian experience of responding to disasters, this had been on a smaller scale than the Haiyan response. Of the commissioning agencies, both Oxfam and Christian Aid had invested in building humanitarian response capacity within NNGO networks with the express purpose of delivering their responses through partnerships. CAFOD had a long-term partnership with the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) which is the pastoral arm of the Catholic Church and has experience of responding to crises.

INGOs that worked exclusively through partners tended to either be Manila-based or have no presence in the Philippines, while those that delivered operational response directly alongside partner-based projects had decentralised operations to the aid hubs in the affected areas. For the first group, there was little doubt that partnership added significant relevance to their response as they relied to a great extent on the knowledge and operational capacity of the NNGOs with whom they partnered (see Box 3).

Box 3:

The use of local knowledge to strengthen the relevance of humanitarian partnerships

Alyansa Tigil Mina (Alliance Against Mining, ATM) is a coalition of organisations and groups collectively challenging the promotion of large-scale mining in the Philippines. It is both an advocacy group and people’s movement. In MacArthur municipality, Leyte, ATM has been partnering with UNLAD, a group of five people’s organisations advocating against local mining practices. When the typhoon hit, ATM had no experience of humanitarian response yet it had extremely good links to communities and a history of partnership with Christian Aid. In responding to the disaster, UNLAD’s existence in the affected areas and links with local communities was considered a key strength of its response as it had a good understanding of the damage that had been caused and its knowledge of the local community allowed it to ensure that assistance was targeted according to need.
For agencies that balanced direct delivery with partnership, NGOs tended to be in closer proximity to the communities they were serving and were more in tune with local conditions. Discussions with communities often highlighted a perception that NGOs had a better understanding of the context.

‘The assistance from Balay Mindanaw and ActionAid was the most valued by us because it responded to what we needed and [we] were involved in the process. [They] were the two organizations the people of Tabgas knew best. It’s because they are very visible here. Their volunteers stay at the Barangay Hall, they ate and bathed with the people... they committed to help in revising our Barangay Development Plan as part of their intervention for rehabilitation.’

In addition to the provision of relief items, partnerships between INGOs and NGOs were also used to advocate on behalf of some of the hardest hit communities to ensure that emerging government policies on relief and recovery were relevant to the needs of those affected by the typhoon. This was particularly important given concerns about the lack of a participatory mechanism for community involvement in the development and implementation of the government’s plan for Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) (see Box 4).

However, the benefits afforded by NGOs’ better understanding of local contexts were only maximised in partnerships where power was shared equally. While the Haiyan response offered examples of this, there were also cases where relationships were unequal and power was skewed towards the INGO. While this was justified by the need for speed and/or to work to scale, it often meant that the contextual knowledge that partnerships can bring was overlooked. It also changed the nature of the partnership to being more akin to sub-contracting, as feedback from an NGO managing a lumber project in Samar suggests.

Box 4: The use of partnerships to strengthen the relevance of humanitarian advocacy

NGOs for Fisheries Reform (NFR) is a coalition of 12 NGOs that are working to achieve fisheries reform at national and local levels, and has been partnering with Oxfam for many years. In light of the lack of consultation with affected communities during the development of the government’s plan for Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), NFR – together with partner NGOs and local city/municipal agriculture offices – held focus group discussions with women and men fisher folk from the major fishing areas of typhoon-affected provinces, specifically among coastal communities in Iloilo, Cebu, Leyte and Palawan. The joint NFR/Oxfam policy paper that resulted from the consultations has been circulated widely within government at all levels and has provided an important opportunity to strengthen the relevance of post-Haiyan policy to affected communities.

We were given the chainsaws as part of a project with an international agency but the feedback from the carpenters is that they break down after seven days and have insufficient power to cut the coconut palms. We’ve asked the organisation to purchase more powerful ones but we were told that this is the standard model. We’re still waiting for replacements but they will be the same model as we’ve already distributed.’
Even when there is pressure to operate at scale or to use specific standards, equality in partnerships can be strengthened if both partners seek to build trust and respect. The research identified one example where there was a commitment to re-balancing power (see Box 5).

**Box 5:**

**The potential for partnership to add relevance to 'standardised' interventions**

Oxfam struggled to find an NNGO partner for its shelter programme. They observed numerous organisations and found that most did not have significant competence in shelter apart from one in Eastern Leyte, Green Mindanao, which had the engineering skills, significant capacity and a professional approach. They were found to be a strong organisation delivering a high-quality project. This was also challenging for Oxfam as it had its own agenda and a standardised approach to shelter construction. Despite the foundations for partnership being considered by both parties to be imperfect, efforts were made to balance the relationship. While the programme worked to a pre-defined set of standards, Green Mindanao offered context-relevant innovations and sourced locally available materials. Both agencies worked together on a pilot and built trust and knowledge, and Oxfam supported training for Green Mindanao volunteers. The skills and techniques Oxfam brought to the partnership alongside the local knowledge and expertise of Green Mindanao has provided a strong foundation to contribute to the long-term resilience of the communities in which they are working.  

Where national NGOs were able to offer particular added value was in their understanding of local politics and the impact this could have on relief distribution. Many NNGOs were critical of international organisations that initially worked exclusively through LGUs as they considered this demonstrated a lack of impartiality. On several occasions, NNGO partners highlighted the role they had played in meeting the needs of communities that had not received government-distributed assistance.

?The aid that was distributed directly by the LGU targeted only some of those most in need of assistance. Those areas that had been lobbying against the mining companies [which the government supported] were missed out. We targeted these areas and others that needed assistance.?  

NNGOs that worked closely with communities, particularly faith-based organisations with extensive networks throughout the affected area and strong links with communities, also had a far greater depth of reach than many INGOs. They had better access to areas considered off-limits either for reasons of security or because they were some distance from access roads.

'I was attending a UN meeting and heard that the area we were working in was considered hard-to-reach, but it's on the main road and we travel there every day. Perhaps it's hard-to-reach by international rather than national standards. While there are security issues for international organisations...NNGOs are better able to move around.'

3.3 Have partnerships enhanced the effectiveness of assistance?

The most common questions posed in the literature on aid effectiveness are whether it is responsive, prepared, fast and flexible; whether it is well coordinated; whether it includes mechanisms to learn from experience, and whether human resources are adequate.

**Timeliness**

Discussions with communities in Leyte and Cebu about who provided them earliest with assistance offered a mixed picture in terms of the timeliness of assistance delivered by humanitarian partnerships. Most tended to say that initial assistance was provided by the LGU, but that this was quickly exhausted. Beyond this, feedback was more mixed, with communities receiving assistance from military sources (both the Philippines Armed Forces and foreign military sources), NNGOs and INGOs. What is important to bear in mind is that the local government and NNGOs were themselves badly affected by the typhoon and were often as much in need of assistance as they were able to provide it.

In addition to being affected by the typhoon, few NNGOs present in the area had significant humanitarian experience and hence they were unprepared to respond. For this reason, much of the second wave of assistance either was delivered directly by organisations based outside the affected area (INGOs and a handful of the larger Manila or Mindanao-based NNGOs), or through established humanitarian networks such as CARRAT and HRC that were able to mobilise quickly. In many cases the mix of knowledge, skills and resources that existed within these partnerships allowed for the provision of funding, the identification of context-relevant projects, the swift procurement of relief items and a capacity to deliver assistance in some of the areas that were considered hardest to reach (see Box 6).
There was a consensus that NNGOs had a far better understanding of the ‘vibe of communities’ and a far more acute understanding of localised vulnerability, the politicisation of assistance and where gaps existed in aid provision. NNGOs were mostly based in the communities they were assisting and this gave them a significant advantage in understanding and responding to their needs, as a comment by an official from Dulong Leyte reveals:

‘Some [organisations] just informed us that they are coming, others sit down with us and discuss our plans... We barely know the organisations except for EcoWEB that deployed a community organiser who helped in organising the farmers, motorbike drivers, the women and the youth. We also knew more of the Earth Village and Green Relief [NNGOs]... We do think it would really be better if we could know the various organisations better so that we could thank them and those who provided the assistance. Most of us assume that the assistance came from abroad because there were also foreigners who came.’

While assistance from all organisations was broadly welcomed by communities, at the time of the study there was growing resentment about the contradictions in the role of INGOs and UN agencies on the one hand, and the lavish way in which they were perceived to live on the other. These perceptions have served to increase the gap between communities and international organisations. NNGOs have had far more success in avoiding these negative perceptions.

**Coordination**

The existence of parallel humanitarian coordination systems and the limited participation of NNGOs has been documented in previous humanitarian responses in the Philippines and the Haiyan response was little different in this regard. Despite some exceptions, many of the NNGOs that were interviewed felt excluded from the Clusters or chose to absent themselves either for reasons of their limited capacity, because they felt unwelcome or in order for them to prioritise humanitarian response. Where partnership has been particularly valuable is in supporting efforts to promote NNGOs’ voice in these meetings by agreeing arrangements to represent them. Given that many of the INGOs had a presence in the humanitarian hubs where coordination occurred and that many had built coordination capacity into their response, this proved a particularly effective aspect of partnership (see Box 7).

**Box 6:**

**The provision of timely assistance through partnerships**

Oxfam rapidly mobilised its partnership with A Single Drop for Safe Water (ASDSW), part of the Humanitarian Response Consortium. They travelled together to Tacloban on 12 November to assess needs and started a response four days later. The mix of Oxfam’s logistics capacity and financial resources linked to ASDW’s knowledge of the water sector in the Philippines enabled them to quickly identify Leyte Metropolitan Water District as a partner, and through the provision of fuel and support to get their staff back into work they were quickly able to recommence services. The mix of Oxfam’s resources and ASDW’s contextual knowledge provided a highly relevant and timely response.

**Responsiveness**

Responsiveness is largely framed in terms of engagement with disaster-affected communities and the importance of ensuring that communities were active participants in their own recovery.

A means by which organisations can enhance their responsiveness to communities is through the provision of information, ensuring the participation of communities in decision-making about projects and listening to feedback, and addressing concerns raised. These undertakings were formalised in the Haiyan response through an emphasis on accountability to affected populations (AAP) and communication with Communities (CwC) which were prioritised partly as a result of the L3 activation. As a consequence, AAP was resourced by the UN with the deployment of an AAP coordinator and the establishment of an AAP Working Group.

Discussions with members of the working group suggested that while some NNGOs had initially attended, participation dropped off relatively quickly and in this regard, the findings of the Haiyan research echo those of the 2013 Missed opportunities study in that ‘partners in general tend to tick fewer technical quality boxes in responses than international direct delivery’. In the Haiyan response the general perception was that while some NNGOs were extremely good at particular aspects of AAP, their knowledge of accountability frameworks and standards was weaker. As a consequence, while NNGOs were considered to excel in engaging with communities on project design and delivery, they tended to perform less well in some of the more formal aspects of accountability to affected populations such as the establishment of complaints mechanisms, which INGOs were better informed about and better able to resource.
Learning and evaluation

Having access to resources for learning and evaluation is an enduring problem for many local organisations. Although there has been a UN-led practice of reviewing humanitarian response through the use of After Action Reviews, there is very limited evidence in the Philippines of NNGOs commissioning or engaging in learning and evaluation activities themselves. One notable exception is the Oxfam-HRC end of project evaluation and assessment report from the Typhoon Bopha Emergency response which offers reflections from Oxfam and three NNGO members of the consortium which were involved in the response.  

The monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning exercise unveiled a lot of issues, good practices and areas for improvement not just in the Typhoon Bopha response but using the latter as a case study in the response delivery by Oxfam-HRC as a whole. The monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning [exercise] provided a space for Oxfam and HRC to step back and take stock of where it is now and where it wants to go.  

This type of partnership for learning can be extremely valuable although only if there is a process put in place to act on the lessons learned. The frequency with which lessons from partnership have had to be relearned from one emergency to the next is a disappointing feature of humanitarian response in the Philippines and is a weakness of the humanitarian system more broadly. Given the emphasis of this research on examining the evidence for humanitarian partnership, the lack of NNGO-commissioned humanitarian evaluations linked to the failure of the international humanitarian system to inculcate and act on lessons about humanitarian partnership is a serious concern.

Human resource capacity

The issue of capacity was frequently raised as a challenge by NNGOs, many of which have experienced a gradual migration of their staff to INGOs and UN agencies. The pace of this increased during the Haiyan response (see Box 8). This movement from national organisations to better-paying international ones not only affects NNGO partners but government as well.

Box 7:
Initiatives taken by INGOs to strengthen NNGO participation in Cluster coordination

One of Oxfam’s earliest partnerships was with the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), a water utility company with responsibility for seven municipalities and Tacloban city. In view of the important role it plays, Oxfam has supported LMWD to attend Clusters from the earliest stages of its interventions and from early 2014 has worked with the company to handover leadership of the Cluster Working Group to them. The development of the next phase of the Cluster water provision strategy will be led by LMWD, with Oxfam and other members of the working group playing a support role.

Box 8:
The migration of staff from NNGOs to international organisations – the experience of EcoWEB

EcoWEB was able to train nine senior staff during their emergency response in Mindanao in 2008–09 and the Typhoon Washi response in 2011–12, but all of them have now been recruited by international agencies. After the humanitarian response in Mindanao, four moved to INGOs; after the Washi response two moved to UN agencies and a third went to an INGO, and since Typhoon Haiyan a senior staff member has moved to a UN agency. The main reason for their departure was that they were attracted by the high salaries that tripled or quadrupled what they were receiving in national organisations. The nine staff had many years of experience working for EcoWEB between them. The trend is much the same for junior staff and volunteers who regularly move on when they have sufficient experience to compete for posts with international organisations.

The implications of the movement of senior staff to higher salaried positions in international organisations are that NNGOs experience fairly constant turnover of staff which tends to peak when capacity is most needed, for example at the time that disasters occur when international organisations are aggressively expanding their programmes and often their staff also. Many NNGOs felt frustrated that an opportunity for strengthening their own capacity was being missed due to the loss of their staff.
This presents a challenge to humanitarian partnerships as NNGOs can rarely compete with international organisations in terms of remuneration. However, one NNGO that had been successful in retaining its staff despite them being offered senior posts elsewhere spoke of the commitment of its staff to staying with the organisation. This commitment was catalysed by the development of a strategic plan to guide organisational development which emphasized the importance of staff capacity development despite limited funding. By building a strong sense of team and by creating an enabling environment for learning and development, the organisation felt confident that it could retain its staff and identity. For INGOs there is a compelling argument to support institutional capacity building and strengthen NNGO leadership capacities.

3.4 Have partnerships enhanced the efficiency and value for money of assistance?

The efficiency of humanitarian aid is linked to the amount of outputs generated for a given input and at the most basic level of cost there is little argument that in specific areas, NNGOs offer efficiencies over INGOs. Most NNGOs that participated in the research were based in the affected area and their staff lived in those communities. They were typified by low-cost and low-profile delivery while direct delivery agencies tended to be based in the coordination hubs, often living in hotels and driving newly purchased vehicles. While international organisations implemented projects through large teams of national staff, there were often significant salary differentials between those employed by INGOs and UN agencies and those working with NNGOs. By living in closer proximity to communities and by working in a more practical way, NNGOs had lower overheads.

Many INGOs and UN agencies initially tended to procure supplies from the global market, while NNGO procurement practice was nationally sourced. There were numerous instances of relief items being deployed from other islands from within the Philippines rather than from international logistics centres such as Dubai. While a focus on efficiency alone would place greater emphasis on cost-savings, through a humanitarian lens, a value for money analysis would incorporate issues of timeliness as well as economy and efficiency which may justify the use of international standby stocks if they can be procured and delivered quicker than locally procured stocks (see Box 9 for a definition of value for money).

Box 9:

What is value for money?

Value for money can be defined as ‘the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes’ and identifies economy, efficiency and effectiveness (the three Es) as the core ways of achieving this:

- Economy refers to the costs of inputs and resources of an intervention (unit costs are typically used as a measure of economy).
- Efficiency refers to how much you get out in relation to what you put in. It’s about maximising an output for a given input, or minimising input for an output.
- Effectiveness refers to how far a programme achieves its intended outcomes, using qualitative and quantitative assessments of change.

Value for money is about weighing up the costs and benefits of the three Es to offer the greatest benefit.

In discussions with NNGOs about value for money it was evident that a premium was placed on the qualitative aspects of the response. One local organisation in Leyte described value for money in terms of the greater effectiveness of their operations as a consequence of their better understanding of context and engagement with communities, resulting in better programmatic outcomes. While the economic value of this perceived benefit is impossible to calculate, an understanding of value for money that goes beyond simplistic economic measures is gaining acceptance among donors and humanitarian organisations alike, and in the context of partnership can offer NNGOs a significant advantage (see Box 10).
Partnership also has costs associated with it that should not be underestimated or ignored. For the Haiyan response there was considerable investment reported by several INGOs in setting up partnership teams to identify, assess and support partner operations. The process of partner assessment itself can take several weeks and include a range of project and support staff. To address issues of absorptive capacity and to reduce perceived financial risk, some NGOs scaled up their own logistics capacity in order to undertake procurement on behalf of their partners. Several also seconded technical staff into partner organisations to make up for short-term capacity gaps. Perhaps the most important cost – and also considered by NNGOs to be one of the greatest gaps in partner investment – is in capacity development, which is essential to ensure preparedness for humanitarian response in the future.

### Box 10:

**The contribution of partnership to efficiency of assistance**

The Philippines Children’s Ministries Network, a partner of Tearfund, is one of the few organisations that is co-located with the municipal government and has built strong links with communities in eastern Samar. While their use of shared office space and local vehicles provides cost-efficiencies compared to other organisations based in the local coordination hub in Guiuan, they consider an additional contribution to value for money to be the effectiveness of their programmes as a result of their proximity to, and knowledge of communities, which they consider strengthens the relevance of their response.

3.5 Have partnerships enhanced coverage?

Coverage relates to whether humanitarian assistance can address all the needs created by a crisis. Key elements of coverage relate to sufficiency of inputs – as well as the scale of operational responses – and the Haiyan response provides a very mixed picture against this criterion.

Of the INGOs that commissioned the study, for the initial relief phase there were three distinct groups:

- Non-operational organisations including Christian Aid and CAFOD, which had a long history of working with NNGOs in the Philippines and placed a high value on partnerships that had been nurtured over a number of years and that benefited from mutual trust and understanding. It was these partnerships that were mobilised in response to the typhoon. In doing this, funding NGOs have been mindful of the importance of supporting partners and have built in processes to support work at scale and to monitor absorptive capacity (see Box 11).

- For the organisations that had handed over their programmes prior to the typhoon and that returned to the Philippines for the purpose of responding to Haiyan, which included ActionAid and Tearfund, both have prioritised response through partners. While neither had pre-existing partnerships, the former chose to swiftly develop these with NNGOs based in the affected areas and the latter drew on its international network, the Integral Alliance, to partner with both INGOs and national NNGOs that were either already established in the Philippines or which had mobilised within days of the typhoon making landfall.

- Of the commissioning agencies, Oxfam was the only one that sought to balance direct delivery alongside partnership, although there were a number of other INGOs that worked in a similar way such as Save the Children, World Vision and Care International.
Box 11:
Examples of humanitarian partnerships between non-operational INGOs and NNGOs

CAFOD works in partnership with the Catholic Church in the Philippines through the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), which in turn works through the parishes via the Diocesan Social Action Centres. This provides it with a huge network throughout the Philippines. NASSA submitted an emergency appeal shortly after the typhoon which received an immediate and generous response from its donors, including from CAFOD. Initial assistance was provided within days of the typhoon and a series of rolling assessments and mobilisation of community volunteers in each of the parishes provided NASSA with significant implementation capacity. While limited capacity of staff and lack of training can limit the complexity of programmes that can be delivered, the advantage of a structure such as NASSA’s is that it is rooted in community and as a consequence has a clear understanding of communities’ needs and organisation. In addition to the provision of funding, CAFOD seconded staff to NASSA to strengthen technical and implementation capacity. CAFOD also provided financial support to train some of NASSA’s staff to strengthen their own understanding of humanitarian response.

Scaling up partnerships between non-operational INGOs and NNGO

While the partnerships that had the longest history were able to deliver significant humanitarian programmes, there were limitations to the size of grants made by INGOs to NNGOs. In the first six months of the response, the largest single grant from the commissioning agencies to a partner was £600,000, although the majority were less than £400,000. In conjunction with the funding, most also invested in supporting skills development, particularly when their partners were unfamiliar with humanitarian assistance. Rather than being considered a risk, this was considered to be a positive progression for partnerships.

‘Christian Aid has been working in the Philippines since the 1970’s and its model of partnership has evolved and taken time to establish...For the Haiyan response we had established partnerships which we used as a springboard for our response...Our partners don’t all have humanitarian experience but Haiyan is the ‘new normal’ and so it is important that their mission evolves with the changing context.’ 70

In order for this evolution to be successful it was considered essential to balance the scale of projects with the partner’s capacity for delivery, which benefited from trust and required extensive consultation. In approaching this, non-operational funding INGOs have sought to encourage growth while at the same time ensuring that their partners retain responsibility for decision-making. One of the implications of this was that when surge staff were deployed, they played a mentoring role rather than taking charge of projects, and there was an expectation that partners’ capacity threshold would grow with experience.

While there is general agreement that partnerships take time to develop, the Haiyan response offered several examples of these being fast-tracked, particularly by Tearfund and ActionAid, both of which established a presence in the Philippines only after the disaster occurred (see Box 12).

Box 12:
Supporting partner capacity development during humanitarian response

Following Typhoon Haiyan, ActionAid set about the task of identifying and assessing potential partners while at the same time seeking to assess needs and launch a humanitarian response. It started the process of getting formal government registration in the subsequent weeks.

Most of the partners which ActionAid selected to support did not have humanitarian experience but they had a background of working in the affected areas which was considered critical. Knowing the limitation of these new partners in humanitarian work, ActionAid invested in capacity development of partner staff to enable them to work effectively. It complemented this by deploying some of its own experienced humanitarian staff to work from an office in Cebu City training and accompanying partners in aspects of project administration and logistics, monitoring and reporting. ActionAid also assisted its partners to participate in the Cluster meetings by providing accompaniment and supporting them to raise their concerns. 71

Scaling up partnerships for INGOs that deliver assistance both directly and with NNGOs

The scale of the devastation caused by Typhoon Haiyan required a massive humanitarian response and some of the direct delivery agencies struggled to balance this with the principles of partnership. There were a number of INGOs which either bypassed their partnerships in the relief phase or which deployed stand-alone humanitarian teams that worked separately from pre-existing programme teams. This was an issue raised by NNGOs in the Mindanao response in 2012 linked to a concern that this created a competitive aid environment and failed to build
response on local knowledge. While the capacity of NGOs in the area affected by Haiyan was far less than that of Mindanao, the issue was raised by a number of NGOs working there.

A second group of INGOs tried to accommodate both their commitment to working in partnership with the imperative to deliver a response that was proportionate to the scale of the need. Among this group were several with long experience of working in the Philippines and which had long-standing partnerships with NGOs. This group of organisations was typified by large budgets of £30-50 million and significant global capacity to support direct delivery. While from a needs perspective they made a significant contribution to the Haiyan response, from a partnership perspective the need to deliver at scale (and spend at speed) was challenging (see Box 13).

Box 13:

The challenges of balancing partnership with direct delivery

Echoing the findings of the Missed opportunities report and those of an evaluation of partnership in Typhoon Bopha, there were instances where for reasons of scale, NGOs were absorbed into the INGO. While this offered some mutual benefits (with the NGO having unprecedented access to resources and an opportunity to shape a scaled-up relief programme at the same time as providing the INGO with valuable contextual knowledge), the partner effectively played a human resource role. In this context, the NGO spoke of having lost their identity, which has subsequently made it difficult for them to carve out a role in the Haiyan response independent of their host.

Even when potential humanitarian partners did exist, INGO ambitions for scale often led to the de-prioritisation of their partnership programmes. Where attempts were made to work with partners, several NGOs found their own partnership assessment tools too unwieldy to use in the compressed timescale that was available. At the time the research was undertaken, fast-track partner assessment tools were being rolled out, although in the interim before this happened some partners had become disillusioned with the process.

For some INGOs, recent attempts to rebuild partnerships for the recovery phase of the response have faltered or failed as many of the stronger NGOs have either gone elsewhere or are unwilling to work as implementing agencies for funding which they perceive has already been programmed. The important lesson here is to prepare for humanitarian partnership, one of the key recommendations of this study.

The fact that many of the pitfalls described above are common in emergencies and are highlighted in the Missed opportunities report raises questions about the enduring challenge of reconciling the humanitarian imperative with partnership approaches. While several of the commissioning agencies gave a strong message about not pushing partners beyond their capacity, others sought to find ways to work beyond their comfort zones in order to meet needs. Although the Haiyan response suggests that there is scope for improvements to be made, it may be necessary to accept that disasters of this magnitude will continue to be a challenge for agencies that seek to support both partnership responsibilities alongside direct delivery.

The lack of scaled-up partnerships is a particular concern for the humanitarian community as programming in the Haiyan-affected areas makes the transition from humanitarian to recovery and the need grows for INGOs to scale back direct delivery and replace it with longer-term, partner-led programmes both for reasons of efficiency and sustainability. While there is evidence that this change is occurring organically, as Clusters and INGOs develop longer-term recovery strategies it is concerning that a number of the large INGOs continue to struggle to identify partners.

3.6 Have partnerships improved connectedness?

Connectedness analyses the extent to which short-term emergency response steps take longer-term and interconnected challenges into account. The strength of partnership working in humanitarian response should be that decisions taken in the short-term are viewed through a long-term lens and take into account the impact that action has on the community. While the lack of humanitarian expertise in NGOs in the areas affected by the Typhoon limited some of the potential benefits that partnership can bring, there were a number of innovative partnerships that successfully linked pre-disaster efforts with humanitarian response at the same time as building humanitarian capacity within NGO partners (see Box 14).
In the Philippines, communities also expressed the connection they had with organisations responding to Haiyan in the terminology that they used, which gave an indication of how they perceived the role of different partners in the response. Assistance received from INGOs and UN agencies was most frequently described as providing ‘help’ while NNGOs were considered to be ‘on a journey’ with the community (see Box 15).

**Box 14:**

**Strengthening the connectedness of the Haiyan response through partnership**

Prior to the Haiyan response, CCI and CERD had recent experience of working with Christian Aid on an inter-agency DRR project which sought to support the implementation of the DRR Management Act by improving the capacity of sub-national stakeholders. As a consequence both organisations had an excellent knowledge of the role of local government in disasters and enjoyed strong links with LGUs and municipalities across east and west Samar. This knowledge allowed them to work effectively alongside the government in the response phase at a time when many others were working outside of government coordination mechanisms. This knowledge also assisted them in understanding the respective roles and responsibilities in theory and how they work in practice, and the humanitarian programme offered an opportunity to build this knowledge.

In the Philippines, relationships between communities and organisations responding to Haiyan were considered to be ‘on a journey’ with the community.

**Box 15:**

**Community perceptions of INGO and NNGO engagement in the Typhoon response**

Discussions with communities in Leyte and Cebu revealed a difference in how they perceived the engagement of INGOs and NNGOs. For the community representatives interviewed, engagement goes beyond the provision of material assistance and which strengthened their capacity and unity. Engagement was also considered to be influenced by the presence of the NNGO in the area.

In Leyte, the Barangay Chairperson used the Visayan term “mitabang” (to help) to describe the assistance of the INGOs but used the term “miuban namo” (to journey with us) to describe the assistance provided by NNGOs, and similar terminology was used by community leaders in other parts of affected areas. For them, engagement is about building a relationship rather than the simple provision of assistance. The presence of some NNGOs participating in the humanitarian response over many years and their better knowledge and understanding of communities provided a strong foundation for more relevant and sustainable assistance.

Looking at the Haiyan response more broadly there is ample reason for concern about the connectedness of the humanitarian response to longer-term challenges. These include the influx of humanitarian staff from outside the country who knew little about the context, the speed with which organisations had to work in order to provide much-needed assistance, the de-linking by some agencies of their development programmes from their humanitarian response and the failure by some organisations to find ways to support partner responses.

**Connectedness and the challenge of transition**

With ‘transition’ from relief to recovery and from a UN-led response to a government-led response there is an understandable level of concern about how to facilitate multiple handovers in leadership, coordination and implementation. With transition plans still being finalised at the time of the study, and with perceptions from within the Philippines of the international humanitarian response being quite separate from the national response, May 2014 appeared to be late in the response to be seeking to bridge the gaps that exist. This begs an important question about the extent to which adequate effort was made from the earliest stages of the relief effort to shape the humanitarian response to complement the efforts of those tasked with the longer-term job of supporting both government and civil society recovery efforts.

Despite some notable good practice in linking relief to longer term partner interventions, this was on a modest scale. Although partly the result of the limited capacity of NNGOs in the affected area, it is also the result of an approach that separated humanitarian response from longer term programming. In this respect the findings of the Missed opportunities research broadly held true in the Typhoon Haiyan response:

> “There was an observable tendency for partnership efforts to sit on top of existing institutional divides and silos rather than resolving them... So, although there is potential for partnerships to ‘smooth the sharp edges’, this is ultimately down to how committed the funding partner is to supporting their partner to do so.”

In the same way that direct delivery agencies tended to struggle the most in taking partnerships to scale to meet coverage demands, with a few exceptions, they also had the most difficulty in connecting their short-term humanitarian work with their longer-term development priorities.
The OECD/DAC criteria for humanitarian evaluation includes the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage and connectedness of assistance.


48 Focus group discussion between Carino Antequisa, Barangay officials and community members in Barangay Tabgas, Albuera, Leyte, 11 May 2014.

49 National Economic and Development Authority (2013). Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda, National Economic and Development Authority, Manila.


51 Interview with Oxfam shelter team leader, Tacloban, 9 May 2014; and interview between Carino Antequisa and Green Mindanao, 10 May 2014.

52 Christian Aid partner, Leyte Province, 29/04/2014.

53 Christian Aid partner, Samar Province, 05//05/2014.

54 See Box 2 for details of how the Humanitarian Response Consortium operates.

55 Interview with A Single Drop for Safe Water, 15 May 2014 and Oxfam GB, 7 May 2014.


58 Interview with AAP Working Group member, Tacloban, 1 May 2014.

59 Interview with AAP Working Group member, Tacloban, 1 May 2014.

60 Focus group discussion between Carino Antiqueusa and officials in Barangay Batug, Dulag, Leyte, 07/05/2014.


62 Ibid (p.40).

63 Interview with EcoWEB, 16 May 2014.

64 Interview between Carino Antequsa and a NNGO Director, Cebu city, 11/05/2014.

65 Focus group discussion with 6 community members, Barangay Liwayway, Macarthur municipality, Leyte, 29/04/2014.

66 Adapted from BOND (2012) What is Value for Money, BOND, London (p. 8)


68 Interview with Christian Aid partner, Leyte Province, 29 April 2014.

69 Interview with Christian Aid staff member, 22/05/2014.

70 Interview between Carino Antequsa and ActionAid Philippines, Cebu City, 14 May 2014.

Role of National Actors

The declaration of Typhoon Haiyan as a Level 3 (L3) emergency under the IASC Transformative Agenda protocols had implications for the way the international humanitarian system was led, coordinated and financed. This section examines the role of national actors in the international humanitarian response, highlighting both the successes and challenges. It makes recommendations for partnership in humanitarian response in the Philippines in the future and for the Transformative Agenda more broadly.

4.1 The organisation of the international humanitarian response

Typhoon Haiyan was the first large-scale natural hazard to strike since the IASC Transformative Agenda was adopted and there was an immediate decision taken and communicated to declare this an ‘L3’ response, a time-bound measure intended to allow humanitarian organisations to make available, as a matter of top priority, the leadership capacities, funds, supplies and personnel required to support the government’s response. In the case of the Philippines, the L3 activation triggered the following actions.

Coordination
A blueprint for Cluster coordination was prepared, and dedicated Cluster leads were deployed as part of the surge. Immediately after the typhoon a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team was deployed. Within weeks of the surge being activated, 160 Cluster staff and more than 80 OCHA staff were deployed, constituting a 242 percent increase in staffing levels over a 10-week period.

Leadership
With the L3 declaration, an empowered leadership protocol was put into effect, enabling the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to take decisions on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), particularly when consensus could not be reached and delays would have serious effect on those in need. A separate core group – with more limited participation of key operational agencies – was temporarily established and met on a daily basis for the first three weeks to decide on issues of strategic importance and to discuss operational bottlenecks. A deputy HC, based in Manila, was appointed two weeks after the typhoon hit and stayed for eight weeks.

Funding
Three-days after the typhoon struck, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator authorised a US$25m allocation from the Rapid Response window of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). In view of the massive scale of the catastrophe, in December the UN launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) requesting US$791m with the intention of supporting the government’s response to the immediate humanitarian needs of those affected by the typhoon for an initial 12 month period. In addition to funding for the UN appeal, there have been significant funds raised internationally and domestically for the response.

4.2 The role played by the government and NNGOs in leading the humanitarian response

What role did the government play in leading the humanitarian response?
Although the role of the UN was to support the Government of the Philippines’ response to the typhoon and the UN’s Strategic Response Plan was described as complementary to the government-authored Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), the reality was somewhat different. While efforts were made to coordinate with the government, the UN in large part played the lead role. The reasons for this are two-fold. The first relates to capacity. Although the government has significant experience of overseeing humanitarian response, Haiyan was of a magnitude that overwhelmed existing disaster management systems including local authorities and government departments tasked with disaster response in the affected areas. In view of the challenges the government faced in responding effectively, a decision was made to create the Office of the Presidential Assistance on Rehabilitation and Recovery, which was tasked to oversee the implementation of RAY. However, by the time this happened the UN-led response was in full swing. While this may have offered the potential for leadership, it took time to organise and by the time the new structure was in place the international surge was already well underway.
The second reason for the limited role played by government in leading the response is linked to the L3 activation in that once the surge had started and the humanitarian architecture began to take shape it gained a momentum of its own, and as the Manila structure was replicated in the designated hubs and staff were deployed, there was very limited latitude for government to shape or influence the humanitarian architecture. In this regard, the humanitarian structure that was deployed in response to Haiyan was little different in shape and composition to that deployed in Pakistan, Haiti or Central African Republic. As a consequence, many international staff felt very comfortable with it and were able to use it effectively. Nevertheless, despite the history of humanitarian response in the Philippines, it still felt very foreign to many of the government officials who were tasked to engage with it. That is not to say the government rejected it; more that it was overwhelming. While mindful of the importance of government leadership, the perceptions of organisations participating in the response and of those who were receiving assistance tended to be that the UN had taken charge.

In what ways did NGO’s participate in humanitarian leadership fora?

Prior to Typhoon Haiyan, NGOs had limited reach into humanitarian leadership and decision-making, with Oxfam playing a leadership role in the HCT on behalf of civil society (Oxfam was the convener of the Philippines INGO Network in addition to having strong links with NGOs). The HCT terms of reference outline a biannual meeting with Filipino civil society actors and although they were not directly represented in the HCT, there was some suggestion that had they wished to, they could have attended. Before the typhoon there had been engagement between members of the UN and the United Nations Civil Society Advisory Committee (UNCSAC), particularly on development policy issues.

While the activation of the L3 brought with it a model of ‘empowered leadership’, there was initially little change in the way the HCT engaged with NGOs. The HC consulted with the UNCSAC some weeks after the typhoon but humanitarian leadership continued to be Manila-based and largely confined to UN agencies and INGOs. A recommendation was made for the newly appointed Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator to establish a Tacloban-based Regional HCT, but this was only acted on several months after the response had started.

The limited participation of NGO representatives in leadership is particularly important in the context of the L3 activation as it requires the development of a collectively agreed initial strategic plan for the response within days of the disaster happening to provide a common framework for analysis and prioritisation. It was anticipated in the Transformative Agenda that this process would address issues of poor quality that have been experienced in the past, as well as drawing on the experience existing within the country to guide new actors arriving to participate in the humanitarian response. While the SRP that was developed days after the typhoon hit the Philippines has been praised for its clarity and is broadly considered to have been successful in providing strategic direction for the immediate response, it lacked NGO participation. This is a clear missed opportunity given the contextual knowledge they have, and has implications both for NGO ownership and their engagement in delivering the plan. Conducted in mid-January, the IASC Operational Peer Review (OPR) explains the limited participation of NGOs.

“In the self-assessment conducted with NGOs, more than half of the respondents were not aware of the Strategic Response Plan. They also expressed unfamiliarity with the functioning and decision-making process of the HCT and asked to be more engaged by the UN system, rating local capacity-building in preparedness and disaster risk reduction as well as involvement of national and local organisations in coordination as their top two priorities.”76

Over time the composition of both the Manila-based HCT and the Regional HCT were modified to include NGO representation in each (the chair of the UNCSAC was invited to join the former and a Visayas-based NGO was included in the latter). This is encouraging and provides an opportunity for greater reach into strategic decision-making both now and in the future.

Recommendations to strengthen humanitarian leadership in the Philippines

Irrespective of the scale, humanitarian response in the Philippines needs to be government-led and draw to a far greater extent on local capacity in order to ensure it is based on a sound understanding of the context. In this respect, this study echoes the statement made from the March 2014 NGO summit on DRR and CCA:
This will require an acknowledgement by the government and relevant ministries of areas of weakness and there is an urgent need for these to be systematically addressed at each of the different administrative levels. While disaster legislation is strong, there is work to do to ensure that this is understood, particularly by LGUs which play an essential operational coordination role.

For both government and for NNGOs, there is also a need to build greater understanding of the international humanitarian architecture. Past lessons have identified a knowledge deficit as one of the key reasons for the lack of synergy between the national and international response which has been a consistent lesson from disaster response in the Philippines. It is now urgent that a concerted effort is made to systematically address this. Given the important anchoring role that NNGOs can play in humanitarian response it is important to capitalise on their recent inclusion in the Manila HCT and Regional HCT to ensure they can play a full role in the leadership of the humanitarian response.

### 4.3 The role of the government and NNGOs in coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan

**What role did the government play in coordinating the humanitarian response?**

In the aftermath of the typhoon and the activation of the L3 protocols, a comprehensive coordination architecture for the response was developed which initially included 13 Clusters (although early recovery and livelihoods were ultimately merged to form a single Cluster) and outlined a government lead and UN agency co-lead. In addition to having a presence in the capital, sub-national Clusters were rolled out in strategic hubs across the affected area. The Philippines is no stranger to the UN Cluster system as it was first rolled out in 2007 and has been used consistently in humanitarian crises since then. While the identification of government partners to lead the Clusters represents good practice, the ability of departments to take up their responsibilities was dependent on their capacity to do so – and in many cases this was limited. Often Cluster leadership defaulted to the UN and at times this occurred in the absence of a government counterpart. Given the number of coordination staff who arrived as part of the surge and were unfamiliar with the context of humanitarian response in the Philippines, it is not surprising that many of them had little knowledge of how either the government or civil society organised itself. While there is little doubt that the surge brought in considerable capacity, the IASC Operational Peer Review correctly noted that ‘national actors admitted to feeling overwhelmed and pushed aside, a concern expressed by several government counterparts when interviewed’.

In addition to the UN Cluster system, the government also has a Cluster system which nominally operates at each of the administrative levels. While in theory the system has existed for some time, in reality at regional level it was still in development and at the province, municipality/city and barangay levels the number and structure of Clusters largely depended on local capacity and experience. LGUs had themselves been badly affected by the typhoon both in terms of the staff and also hardware (such as offices, computers, vehicles, hazard maps etc.) that they required to coordinate effectively. As a consequence of this and also due to perceptions in some barangays of the politicisation of assistance, use of the formal government coordination system was patchy (although interviews suggested that there were municipalities and barangays where coordination meetings were regularly run and well-attended).

**In what ways did NNGO’s participate in humanitarian coordination fora?**

While INGOs were often able to scale-up their teams to ensure participation in coordination forums and were often based in humanitarian hubs which made it easier for them to attend, this was more challenging for NNGOs. While interviews suggested that some NNGOs felt that Clusters added value, barriers to their participation were numerous. Staff capacity limitations, a lack of familiarity with the international humanitarian architecture, poor access to transport, the long distance between field sites and coordination hubs exacerbated by the predilection for having meetings at the end of the day (making it impossible to return on public transport) were all obstacles to NGO participation in Clusters. For many, the international look and feel of Cluster meetings and the lack of translation made them feel out of place and unable to confidently represent themselves, which led to many NNGOs deciding not to attend. The disappointment that many NGO staff expressed was summarised by the Executive Director of a NGO with significant humanitarian experience:

> “Government should be the anchor – its leadership solid – in providing strategic direction to multiple stakeholders, whether local or foreign, in times of disasters. This will uphold Filipino sovereignty in all humanitarian actions and in directing international aid to fit our country’s contexts and plans – not the other way around.”

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**Missed Again – making space for partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan response**

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77 Missed Again

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“I see the need to enhance the Cluster system to make it more responsive to the local context, especially in big disasters like Haiyan where local structures – especially the government – are not prepared. [In these situations] international agencies and the UN Cluster system are very much needed but there is also a need for locals to participate in the humanitarian Cluster system. What we hoped is that the humanitarian system would be more sensitive, responsive and empowering to local initiatives and would make coordination less burdensome to the NGOs.”

In the early stages of the response there were some innovative approaches taken by NGOs in partnership with INGOs to map out and coordinate activities as a way for local NGOs to participate in coordination activities in coordination centres operating a local, NGO-friendly environment. These coordination centres (located in Cebu, Ormoc, Tacloban) provided local actors access to contribute information about who was doing what and where, news on the Cluster system, facilities to access training and attend meetings, as well as introductions to international partners. Some NGOs were also proactive in representing their NGO partners in coordination meetings and facilitating the flow of information (see Box 16).

**Box 16: INGO support for partner coordination**

In Samar, Christian Aid initially accompanied its partners to coordination meetings as a way to build confidence and familiarity with the Clusters. While this supported their engagement in the early weeks of the response, with time partner interest tended to wane as there was a perception that the meetings were oriented towards the needs of the UN rather than those of the response more broadly.

Efforts were also made by OCHA to strengthen NGO participation in the Clusters through the deployment of a Liaison Officer several weeks after the response had started to reach out to NGOs to explain the humanitarian architecture (see Box 17) but these efforts catered to only a small proportion of NGOs.

**Box 17: Good practice by OCHA in supporting NGO participation in coordination**

From early December, an OCHA NGO Liaison Coordinator was deployed to the Philippines to improve engagement with NGOs. There was a concern that while there were significant numbers of NGOs, it had proved difficult to find contact details (particularly for those working in the affected area) and there was a need to understand the capacity that existed and how it could best be mobilised. OCHA was also concerned about the limited exposure there had been to the international humanitarian system and so developed a training module on key elements of the coordination architecture which was delivered in several humanitarian hubs.

Although Clusters were established in provincial centres, these were still considered by many NGOs to provide only limited support to operational coordination. To address this, Oxfam made efforts to support the Ministry of Health in decentralising WASH Cluster meetings from Tacloban to the surrounding municipalities and the shelter Cluster did similar, but these initiatives appear to have been the exception rather than the norm. Where Clusters were decentralised there were benefits of greater NGO participation and a much more detailed level of information.

“Since our main focus is on providing shelter, we attended the shelter Cluster. At the beginning, the meetings were held in Cebu City, about three hours’ drive from Bogo City where most of the shelter projects are located. The groups that were based here requested that the shelter Cluster meeting be held here. It was granted, hence, we were able to participate more.”

At the time that the study was being conducted, efforts were being made to try to bring greater coherence to the coordination in order to ensure that the Cluster system could be accommodated within government. The challenges of this are two-fold; firstly, given the UN Clusters are not a perfect fit with the government system there is a need to agree how to best transition from what exists now to what can be led and sustained by government departments in the future. The second challenge is how best to work with government in order to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to maintain the Clusters during the vital recovery phase.
4.4 Access of NGOs to humanitarian funding for the Typhoon Haiyan response

One of the aspirations of an L3 activation is timely and proportionate mobilisation of resources. The CERF allocation of US$25 million made within 72-hours of the disaster and the drafting of the SRP soon afterwards went some way to realising this ambition. While this provided seed funding for the UN agencies and supported INGO funding requests, the picture was less positive for NGOs.

The Philippines is a middle-income country, and as a consequence in recent years has not been considered as a donor priority for development assistance. With the exception of the conflict-affected areas in the south of the country which have continued to receive humanitarian funds, NGOs complained that multi-year funding was dwindling and as a consequence their projects had diminished in size. As a result of the limited availability of funds, a networked model of civil society that partnered relatively small NGOs working at community-level with a Regional or Manila-based Secretariat for purposes of advocacy and lobbying was popular. Within this model there has been very little funding available for institutional capacity building and support, particularly in humanitarian response. Several of the NGOs interviewed considered this one of the key reasons for the limited national capacity that existed in the Visayas region of the Philippines. This may also go some way to explaining the significant migration of NGOs from the comparatively better-funded region of Mindanao which was not affected by the typhoon.

While several humanitarian networks that had a mandate for country-wide response did exist, even these agencies spoke of the challenges of funding institutional capacity building outside of their operational responses.

What humanitarian funding did NGOs receive?

After the typhoon, partners best placed to receive funding were those with existing links to INGOs which were quickly able to mobilise resources and provide initial funding relatively swiftly. Members of Christian Aid’s Rapid Response Assessment Team and the Oxfam-supported HRC were provided with funding to initiate a response. Faith-based organisations such as NASSA and ICM that could draw on funding from their international constituents were also able to mobilise comparatively quickly. However, there were a large number which either had to draw on their own limited resources or which had to wait for funding to trickle down the aid chain.

“We were able to mobilise some funds but it was not enough. We approached some big INGOs but they did not respond to our request. Some said they could not give funding because it was not part of their mandate. It took sometime before we were able to raise enough funds for the distribution of the goods...Accessing funds for operations is really a big challenge for NGOs.”

While some NGOs that had been working in long-term partnership with INGOs were able to access humanitarian funding fairly swiftly, there was an equal number that struggled to secure funds in a timely way. Given the extent of the devastation, there was an urgent need for INGOs to scale up their partnerships and in seeking to do this, a number found that their internal partner capacity assessment tools and risk-management systems lacked the flexibility required to take on new partners or increase the scale of partnerships in a timely way. In view of this, several had to prepare fast-track procedures that balanced due diligence with the need to respond quickly.

Funding from bilateral donors and pooled funds

While many bilateral donors were generous with their funds, they considered the international organisations to offer the benefit of being able to absorb large grants at the same time as offering a greater degree of assurance that timely delivery of assistance would follow. While there may have been an anticipation that some funding would be passed on to local partners, this was not an explicit requirement and many UN agencies and INGOs tended to prioritise direct delivery over partnerships.
A review of the SRP shows that a single NNGO was included in the appeal but interviews highlighted the difficulties it experienced in trying to understand what this meant in terms of the potential for fundraising. Five months after the SRP had been launched and after repeated attempts to request assistance with the process, the NNGO was still waiting for an explanation.

Pooled funding can provide timely support for NNGO humanitarian action, but while there was a swift allocation from the CERF, requests made by the HC in Manila in November 2013 for an Emergency Response Fund (ERF) to be activated were turned down on the basis that there was a lack of donor support. While the short-term nature of ERF funding means it cannot contribute directly to capacity development, it would have provided funding directly to NNGOs and would have assisted in increasing familiarity and engagement of local organisations in the international humanitarian system. This echoes a similar conclusion about the value of a pooled fund after the Typhoon Washi response which was made in the OCHA-led After Action Review.

Recommendations to strengthen NNGO financing in the Philippines

Given the concerns about how to responsibly transition the Haiyan response from relief to recovery and the emphasis that is placed on the greater use of national capacity, the failure of humanitarian financing to be adequately inclusive of NNGOs in the relief phase is both inexplicable and inexcusable. While the possibilities to significantly scale-up partnership may currently be limited, it would offer considerable benefits to continuity of the response while offering the potential of developing humanitarian skillsets in real-time. Looking ahead, this trend of prioritising the international over the national needs to be urgently addressed by making funding more accessible to NGOs seeking to respond to disasters. An important contribution to achieving this aim could be made by establishing an ERF in the Philippines. The activation of an ERF that aims to ring-fence funding for NNGOs87 would go some way to providing funding for rapid onset humanitarian response and at the same time foster greater engagement of NNGOs with the wider humanitarian architecture. Given the generous donor response that often required the deployment of staff to disburse and monitor aid funds, a pooled fund such as an ERF would also offer donors an efficient means of contributing to humanitarian response in the future.

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75 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2014) Operational Peer Review: Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines , 3 February 2014 (p.11).
76 Ibid. (p.10).
77 NNGO Summit on DRR-CCA: Local voices and participation as key to building resilience, Cebu City, 26-27 March 2014.
80 Interview between Carino Antequisa and an NNGO Executive Director, 20 May 2014.
82 Interview between Carino Antequisa and the Relief and Rehabilitation Unit of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cebu, 12 May 2014.
84 Interview with Eastern Visayas Network of NGOs and PSOs, 7 May 2014.
85 Interview with A Single Drop for Safe Water, 15 May 2014.
86 Interview between Carino Antequisa and NNGO Executive Director, 20/05/2014.
87 In Pakistan, the recognition by all humanitarian actors that NNGOs had insufficient access to humanitarian funding led to a decision being taken by the Advisory Board to prioritise NNGOs over others.
The importance of partnership as the central pillar of humanitarian response

This section draws conclusions from the two research questions on the effectiveness of partnerships in the Haiyan response and the engagement of national actors in the international humanitarian system, and asks what the findings mean for the role of partnership and its potential as a central pillar of humanitarian response. Recommendations are made to strengthen partnership in humanitarian action between the Government of the Philippines, NNGOs and CSOs and the members of the international humanitarian system.

5.1 The effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in the Typhoon Haiyan Response

The Haiyan study reconfirms many of the findings of the Missed opportunities research:

- That humanitarian partnership can strengthen the contextual relevance of assistance
- That partnerships can offer efficiencies
- That partnerships can contribute to a more connected response and thereby offer greater sustainability.

While this study has shown the potential for humanitarian partnerships to deliver effective assistance, it has also revealed weaknesses in the capacity of NNGOs partners or their access to funding, which contributed to a challenge for partnerships to respond at scale. Despite the fact that NNGOs were among the earliest responders to the typhoon, they played a relatively minor role in comparison with INGOs, which tended to have greater access to funding and superior logistics capacity, allowing them to work at significant scale. The findings suggest it is combining the comparative advantages of INGOs and NNGOs that enables humanitarian partnerships to be most effective. While there were some examples of this, there were also many instances where partnership was deprioritised, overlooked or ignored.

5.2 The engagement of national actors in the international humanitarian system

Despite some efforts to include local and national actors in the Haiyan response, it remained largely internationally led, coordinated and financed. While the scale of the disaster was beyond the capacity of NNGOs and government to adequately respond alone, more could have been done to build capacity to prepare for and to strengthen partnership in response to the disaster. Six months after Haiyan made landfall, the international humanitarian system was struggling with the task of responsibly handing over the recovery response to the government and NNGOs. The lack of adequate support to assist the Philippines to prepare for large-scale disasters and the lack of willingness to entrust a greater share of the response to national organisations has played an important role in the perceived need to ‘scale-up to scale-down’ – a euphemism for a further influx of international capacity to build national capacity in key institutions in order to permit a handover. The findings of the study suggest that this is true across all aspects of the response – leadership, coordination and implementation. There are widespread fears within civil society that one of the implications of such an internationalised response is that it becomes highly vulnerable as capacity is withdrawn.

5.3 The failure to learn lessons and the challenge for humanitarian partnership in the future

Many of the findings of this study of how international and national organisations worked together in the Haiyan response are not new, and it is disappointing that so many of them echo similar findings documented after previous humanitarian responses in the country. These include:

- The lack of communication about how the international humanitarian system is configured and how it operates;
- The existence of parallel coordination mechanisms;
The inequalities in the humanitarian system that often prioritise the international over the national;
The enduring importance of capacity development for disaster response for government and civil society.

Above all else, action is required to review and systematically address these challenges.

However, one issue that stands out in the Haiyan response more than others (and was also a finding of the Missed opportunities study) is the challenge of taking partnership to scale, and it is this that sets an important and urgent agenda for the humanitarian community. Despite the considerable experience of nationally led humanitarian response in the Philippines and perceptions of the significant capacity of civil society, the limited scale of humanitarian partnerships in the Haiyan response (and the predilection for those agencies that seek to balance direct delivery and partnership to prioritise the former over the latter) suggests it may be necessary to moderate expectations of what scale of response can be achieved through current humanitarian partnerships, and explore how best to address impediments to scale-up through partnerships in more detail. Translated to the global context where human vulnerability is growing (as the potential for larger and more frequent disasters increases), it is this aspect of humanitarian partnerships more than others that requires greater investigation and investment.

### 5.4 Recommendations

The international humanitarian community should prioritise investment in humanitarian partnership to enable rapid and quality scale ups:
Action must be taken both in the Philippines and in other countries vulnerable to disaster risk to engage government, national and international humanitarian stakeholders and donor agencies in strengthening national disaster response. Such a strategy should outline how a government-led and civil society-supported humanitarian system can provide effective assistance to disaster-affected people in the future.

- **INGOs** should support capacity development as an essential ingredient of successful partnership and publish the percentage of funds they allocate to humanitarian preparedness and capacity building.

- **INGOs** must improve their partner assessment tools, which were found too cumbersome and needed modifying in order to balance the demands of due diligence with sufficient agility to enable decision-making within the compressed timeframes required for an emergency response.

- **INGOs** should work with **NNGO** partners to explore practical ways of scaling up partnerships. NNGOs have the potential to provide significant national humanitarian response capacity but the Haiyan response revealed the challenges in achieving successful partnership at scale.

- In order to strengthen scale-up all international humanitarian actors, donors, UN agencies and INGOs should provide a minimum percentage of their humanitarian funding directly to NNGOs, publish what this percentage is, and set themselves targets to increase it.

- **INGOs** must support **NNGOs** and national humanitarian networks in the Philippines to identify key blockages to NNGO participation in disaster responses, and systematically address these. This should be accompanied by an adequate level of dedicated funding. Despite the significant experience of NNGOs in humanitarian response they played a relatively modest role in the Haiyan response.

- **The Humanitarian Country Team** should urgently review recent evaluations and act on the lessons learned. The Missed again research found evidence that humanitarian partners are repeating the same mistakes in successive humanitarian responses in the Philippines.

### ‘Localise’ surge responses

The Haiyan response provides an important vantage point from which the IASC can reflect on recent experience of large-scale international humanitarian responses with a view to complementing the international L3 surge mechanism with national surge capacity.

- **The Inter-Agency Standing Committee** should identify those countries most vulnerable to disaster or at risk of large-scale conflict and adapt the Common Framework for Preparedness to include a set of actions to ensure that an international surge can be complemented by a national one. This should include a package of training, communication and support delivered by OCHA and targeted at government representatives and NNGOs.
The Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by OCHA should strongly advocate for the establishment of an ERF in the Philippines. International donors should contribute generously to it.

The Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA should work with the Government of the Philippines to ensure greater coherence in the future activation and use of the Cluster system in the Philippines.

NGOs should be immediately included in the Humanitarian Country Team. OCHA and members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee should ensure that this becomes routine in all disaster-affected countries.

Prioritise preparedness
In looking to the future of humanitarian response in the Philippines, much more needs to be done to prepare for disaster events, the most significant being to consider Typhoon Haiyan as the new 'normal' rather than an exception, and to systematically invest in partnerships that can meet the challenges associated with responding at scale. This can only be achieved through a transformative change in investment in preparedness and national capacity development. Alongside this, there is clearly scope for INGOs to strengthen standby partnership arrangements and to ensure partnership assessment tools are effective for rapid scale-up in the future.

The Government of the Philippines should review and strengthen its capacity to respond at all levels in order to play its leadership role in response to large-scale crises. International donors should provide adequate funding and OCHA and NGOs should support this process providing training and technical assistance to enhance national-level preparedness.

Given the key role that Local Government Units (LGUs) play in early response, the Government of the Philippines should fast-track the establishment of LGU DRRM offices and prioritise capacity building of LGU’s.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee must urgently re-balance the response aspirations of the Transformative Agenda with preparedness in order for disaster-affected countries to be better placed to lead, coordinate and implement disaster response themselves.

88 For a comparison of the findings from the Missed Opportunities research and this study see Annex 2
Annex 1: Research Participants

In addition to the participants listed below the author participated in the Region VIII workshops for the OCHA-led After Action Review for the Yolanda response.

**Manila**

**Government and local authorities**
- Gerry De Belen, Overall Coordinator, Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

**National NGOs and networks**
- Isagani Serrano, President, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
- Becky Malay, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (and chair of the Philippines UN Civil Society Advisory Council)
- Cathy Tiongsin, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (and chair of the Philippines UN Civil Society Advisory Council)
- Lou Gargarita, Executive Director, Philippine Social Enterprise Network
- Dennis Calven, Executive Director, NGOs for Fisheries Reform
- Phillippa Keys, Response Manager, Food for the Hungry Philippines
- Kevin Lee, Executive Director, A Single Drop of Water
- Dr Mahar Mangahas, President, Social Weather Stations
- Vladymir Joseph Licudine, Deputy Director for Surveys, Social Weather Stations
- Raquel Hopton, Donor Services Manager, International Care Ministries
- Amparo ‘Ampy’ Miciano, Secretary General, Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (PKKP/ National Coalition of Rural Women)
- Regina S Antequisa, Executive Director, Ecosystems Work for Essential Benefits (EcoWEB)

**International agencies and NGOs**
- Sarah Mace, Communication with Communities Officer, OCHA Manila
- Sanjeev Bhanja, Tearfund, Philippines Response Manager
- Jane Bañez-Ockelford
- Partnership Relations Manager
- Oxfam
- David Carden, Head of Office, OCHA
- John Reinstein, Deputy Team Leader, Programmes, Save the Children International
- Krista Zimmerman, Advocacy Officer, Save the Children International
- Ted Bonpin, Senior Emergency Programme Manager, Christian Aid in the Philippines

**Donor agency representatives**
- Arlynn Aquino, Programme Officer, European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) Philippines
- Elyn Fernandez, Programme Assistant, European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) Philippines
- Pablo Lucero, Senior Programme Officer, Development Cooperation, Australian Embassy
- Anne Orquiza, Portfolio Manager, Development Cooperation, Australian Embassy

**Leyte**

**Government and local authorities**
- Blanche T. Gobencion, Regional Director, Office of Civil Defense, Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
- Rey M. Gozon, Assistant Regional Director, Office of Civil Defense, Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
- Rene Moshe, Amano Administrative Officer, Tacloban City
- Paul Mooney, Admin Officer 1 of CDRRMO, Tacloban City Hall

**National NGOs and networks**
- Jun Urot, Ecosystems Work for Essential Benefit (EcoWEB) volunteer assigned to Dulag, Leyte
- Colynn Laurio, Radya Al-Salam Foundation Inc. (RASFI)
- Sr Mary Francis B. Anover, Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP)
Missed Again – making space for partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan response

Rev Fr Arcris Badana, focal person, Relief and Rehabilitation Center of the Archdiocese of Palo (RRCAP)
Charlie, Programme Officer, Green Mindanao Programme Manager, Alyansa Tigil Mina/Alliance Against Mining (ATM)
Paulina Lawsin, Executive Director, Eastern Visayas Network of NGOs and POs, Tacloban

International agencies and NGOs
Andrew Martin, Deputy Head of Office, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Tacloban
Presciosa Derro, Humanitarian Affairs Analyst, OCHA, Tacloban
Catherine Green, Humanitarian Accountability Manager, World Vision International, Tacloban
Nicole Hahn, WASH Cluster, UNICEF, Tacloban
Yol Omlya, Education Officer, UNICEF, Tacloban
Wan S. Sophonpanich, CCCM Cluster, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Tacloban
Pamela Palma, Programme Manager, Tacloban and Eastern Leyte, Oxfam GB
Hashmi Zubair, Shelter Team Leader, Tacloban and Eastern Leyte, Oxfam GB
Bagus Setyaw, WASH Team Leader, Tacloban and Eastern Leyte, Oxfam GB
Esther Kabahuma, Public Health Promotion Team Leader, Tacloban and Eastern Leyte, Oxfam GB
Consuelo “Cho” Locop, Just Projects International

Donor agency representatives
Yves Horent, Humanitarian Advisor, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Department for International Development
Sallee Gregory, Team Leader, Philippines Field Response Team, Department for International Development

Community discussions
Barangay Liwayway, MacArthur, Leyte
Barangay Batug, Dulag, Leyte
Barangay Tabgas, Albuera, Leyte

Cebu

National NGOs and networks
Sr Mapet Bulawan, Programme Manager, Relief and Rehabilitation Unit of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cebu (RRU-RCAC)
Ledrolen Manriquez, The Peace and Conflict Network – Philippines (PECOJON – Philippines)

International agencies and NGOs
Nasir Uddin, Disaster Management, ActionAid
Amar Jyotil, Disaster Preparedness and Response, ActionAid
Joseph Chako, CAFOD/CARITAS Philippines
Jennifer MacCann, Operations Director, World Vision International – Typhoon Haiyan response

Community discussions
Barangay Caputatan Sur, Medellin, Cebu

Samar

National NGOs and networks
Aileen Diaz, Centre for Empowerment and Resource Development, Eastern Samar
Maila Quiring, Coastal Core International, Eastern Samar
Maureen Ukundi, Philippines Children’s Ministerial Network

Other
Sandrine Tiller, Programmes Adviser - Humanitarian Issues, MSF
Jamie Munn, ICVA Regional Representative, Asia, Bangkok
Randa Hassan, NGO Liaison & Partnership, OCHA, Geneva
Cressida Thompson, Deputy Head for Asia, Tearfund

Community discussions
Barangay Liwayway, MacArthur, Leyte
Barangay Batug, Dulag, Leyte
Barangay Tabgas, Albuera, Leyte
Annex 2: Comparison of findings from the Missed Opportunities report and the Haiyan study

For each of the criteria included in the Missed opportunities research, an assessment was made of the potential for partnerships to address each area of performance developed from combining the research team’s assessments of the partnership work in each of the four emergency response settings (DRC, Horn of Africa, Haiti and Pakistan). As a contribution to strengthening the evidence-base for humanitarian partnerships, a similar set of summaries and scores were developed for partnership working in the Typhoon Haiyan response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missed opportunities research</th>
<th>Typhoon Haiyan study</th>
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<tr>
<td>The potential for partnerships to enhance performance (good, moderate, weak)</td>
<td>The contribution that partnerships made to enhancing performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Have partnerships enhanced the relevance and appropriateness of aid?**

- **STRAWNG**
  - Across the agencies in the four emergency settings, ‘relevance/appropriateness’ was the criterion most strongly identified by respondents as a beneficial outcome of partnerships in response efforts.

- **GOOD**
  - There are some very positive aspects to how partnerships can contribute to effectiveness of response. These include speed, accountability and engagement. However, this positive picture is mitigated by the challenges partners face in areas such as coordination, learning and human resources.

- **MODERATE**
  - Based on work across the agencies in the four settings, there may be less scope for partnerships to enhance efficiency in the short-term. This is because partnerships are not a silver bullet – they require time and effort to be invested in strategic and intelligent ways.

- **MODERATE**
  - Issues of scale of delivery cannot be addressed simply by pumping funds into national and local organisations. Based on the work of the agencies in the four settings, this is the most challenging area for partnerships, and currently contributes least to overall performance.

**Have partnerships enhanced the effectiveness of aid?**

- **STRAWNG**
  - The proximity to and knowledge of communities that NNGOs bought to partnerships strengthened the relevance of humanitarian assistance.

- **GOOD**
  - Where INGOs had invested in NNGO humanitarian consortia, partnerships contributed to a timely response although this was on a small-scale. NNGOs knowledge of communities strengthened the effectiveness of humanitarian response. However, while some good practice exists, coordination, capacity and learning were all areas of comparative weakness.

- **MODERATE**
  - Lower overhead costs and salaries meant that NNGOs offer efficiencies over INGOs but these are offset by the additional costs borne by INGOs for operational and technical support for partners. A value for money analysis would also take into account the qualitative aspects of NNGOs’ responses such as their better understanding of context and engagement with communities that can result in better programmatic outcomes.

**Have partnerships enhanced the efficiency and value for money of aid?**

- **STRAWNG**
  - Where INGOs working in partnership with faith-based NNGOs benefited from their extensive networks, direct delivery by INGOs accounted for the much of the coverage and in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon was often prioritised over partnership.

- **GOOD**
  - There are some very positive aspects to how partnerships can contribute to effectiveness of response. These include speed, accountability and engagement. However, this positive picture is mitigated by the challenges partners face in areas such as coordination, learning and human resources.

- **MODERATE**
  - Based on work across the agencies in the four settings, there may be less scope for partnerships to enhance efficiency in the short-term. This is because partnerships are not a silver bullet – they require time and effort to be invested in strategic and intelligent ways.

**Have partnerships enhanced coverage?**

- **STRAWNG**
  - Across the agencies in the four emergency settings, ‘relevance/appropriateness’ was the criterion most strongly identified by respondents as a beneficial outcome of partnerships in response efforts.

- **GOOD**
  - There are some very positive aspects to how partnerships can contribute to effectiveness of response. These include speed, accountability and engagement. However, this positive picture is mitigated by the challenges partners face in areas such as coordination, learning and human resources.

- **MODERATE**
  - Based on work across the agencies in the four settings, there may be less scope for partnerships to enhance efficiency in the short-term. This is because partnerships are not a silver bullet – they require time and effort to be invested in strategic and intelligent ways.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have partnerships improved connectedness?</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>MODERATE</th>
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<td></td>
<td>This is an area where partnership-based responses come into their own. Because of the continued presence of national and local partners, and ongoing engagement with the communities in question, there is much more scope for these actors to bridge the gaps between the different silos apparent in the international system.</td>
<td>There was the potential for NNGOs to strengthen the connectedness of the response, but in many cases NNGOs were also newcomers to the Visayas (the area affected by the typhoon).</td>
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Missed Again – making space for partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan response
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